Lin Hsin Hsin Quantum Security Center











Quantum Threats by
Layer and Component






Layer 1 -- Physical Layer


              Components

              📍 CMOS/CCD sensors
              📍 Chip-integrated laser components
              📍 Electro-optic transducers
              📍 Micro-Electromechanical Systems (MEMS)
            Quantum Threats
            Quantum Sensing Attacks

            CMOS/CCD sensors

            Quantum sensors (eg NV centers in diamond) can detect ultra-weak signals, potentially eavesdropping on optical or electronic emissions from sensors, even if shielded


            Chip-integrated lasers

            Quantum-enhanced spectroscopy could analyze laser emissions to reverse-engineer encryption keys or internal states


            Side-Channel Attacks

            📍 Electro-optic transducers


            Quantum sensors can detect minute variations in electromagnetic fields, revealing data being processed or transmitted


            📍 Switching transistors:


            Quantum noise or interference could be used to induce faults or extract information via power/EM analysis


            Quantum Decoherence


            Quantum states in physical components (eg qubits in hybrid systems) can be disrupted by environmental noise or intentional quantum interference
            Layer 1     Layer 1.5     Layer 2     Layer 3     Layer 4 -7     Summary